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One of the studies being carried out by the Mineral Trade and Mark- 
ets Project is examining recent trends in metal trade patterns. As now 
envisaged, this study will contain four substantive chapters. The first will 
review changes in the location of metal mining over the last three 
decades, and attempt to identify the important determinants responsible 
for these changes. The second will focus in a similar manner on geo- 
graphic shifts in metal consumption, while the third will investigate 
trends in the stage of production at  whch metal trade takes place. The 
fourth will analyze the role of transportation costs, political blocs, inter- 
national ownership ties, and other factors that influence the choice of 
trading partners and introduce rigidities into international trade flows. 
This worlung paper is a preliminary version of the first chapter con- 
cerned with the location of metal mining. It will be revised for publication 
when the other parts of the study are completed. The purpose of circu- 
lating it at  t h s  time is to elicit comments, criticisms, and suggestions for 
improvement. 
John E. Tilton 
Research Leader 
Mineral Trade and Markets Project 
Substantial sh f t s  in the geographic location of mining have taken 
place over the last three decades. These shifts, and the underlying fac- 
tors causing them, are examined in thls study of six important metallic 
commodities--bauxite, copper, iron, nickel, tin, and zinc. 
The widely held belief that the developed countries, due to the 
exhaustion of their own mineral resources, are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the developing countries for the important minerals 
needed by their advanced economies receives little support. It is true 
that the United States and other highly industralized countries have seen 
their share of world mineral production fall. However, the growth of min- 
mg in Australia, Canada, and South Africa has largely offset t h s  decline. 
This study also concludes that the factor endowment theory of inter- 
national trade is of some use in analyzing resource production and trade. 
A positive and generally significant relationship is found between reserves 
and production, which suggests that a sizable portion of the inter-country 
variation in mimng can be attributed to dfferences in mineral endow- 
ment. The theory, however, offers no insights into why mineral endow- 
ments change over time, causing substantial shifts in the comparative 
advantage of mining. Ths ,  along with other identified shortcomings, 
means the factor endowment theory provides at  best an incomplete 
explanation of mineral trade and production. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN MINING 
John E. Tilton 
The depletion of h g h  grade mineral deposits in the United States and 
other industrialized nations, it is widely believed, is forcing these coun- 
tries to rely increasingly on imports, particularly from the developing 
countries, for needed supplies of metallic ores. This possibility raises a 
number of interesting questions. Specifically, how stable over time is 
comparative advantage in mining? Are the major producing countries of 
today the same as a decade or two ago, or have significant shf ts  in com- 
parative advantage taken place? Where shf t s  have occurred, have they 
generally favored the developing countries? Perhaps of even more impor- 
tance, why have there been shifts? Is mineral depletion in the industrial- 
ized countries largely responsible? More generally, what are the major 
determinants of comparative advantage in mining, how have they 
changed over time, and what have been the consequences? 
This study examines such questions. It begins by reviewing recent 
trends in the location of mining for a number of the more important 
metals. It then examines the major factors responsible for the shifts in 
comparative advantage that have occurred over time. 
A country is presumed to have a comparative advantage in mining if 
it is a major ore producer. Using this criterion, a country may possess a 
comparative advantage even though its costs of production are not par- 
ticularly low relative to other countries. This could occur, for instance, 
where a government provides its mining sector with subsidies or protec- 
tion from lower cost imports. Alternatively, a country may be a major 
producer simply because it developed substantial mine capacity during 
an earlier era when its costs were lower. 
Thus, the term comparative advantage is used here in a broader 
sense than in many other studies. In particular, international trade 
theory, examined later in t h s  study, generally assumes that comparative 
advantage depends solely on comparative costs. Indeed, the two terms 
are often used as synonyms in t h s  literature. However, as this study is 
ultimately concerned with the ability of a country to produce metal pro- 
ducts for export and domestic consumption, a broader use of the term 
comparative advantage seems more appropriate. 
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Patterns and Trends in Mine Production 
While the mine production of all major metals has grown greatly over 
the last three decades, the market shares of individual producing coun- 
tries have waxed and waned. Comparative advantage in mining, it 
appears, is a fickle friend. Withn a period as short as twenty years it can 
shf t  sharply from one set of countries to another. 
Bauxite in particular illustrates t b s  phenomenon.1 In 1850, Suri- 
nam, Guyana, and the United States together accounted for 60 percent of 
world production. By 1980, not one of these countries remained among 
the top three producers. Australia, whose output was negligible in 1950, 
was mining far more bauxite than any other country. Guinea had over- 
taken Jamaica as the second largest producer, and Brazil was embarked 
on an investment program that would make it a major producer during 
the 1980s. 
In copper, the changes have been somewhat less dramatic. Still, 
Zambia and particularly the United States have yielded part of their 
share of world output to the Soviet Union, Poland, Peru, the Philippines, 
and other countries that produced little or no copper in the 1950s. In iron 
ore, U.S. production, which in 1950 exceeded the combined output of the 
next four producers, was surpassed by the Soviet Union in the 1Q50s, and 
then by Australia and Brazil in the 1970s. The market shares of France 
and Sweden, both major producers in the early postwar period, have also 
declined. 
In nickel, Canada has watched its output drop from 76 percent of the 
world total in 1950 to 26 percent in 1980, while Australia and Indonesia 
have entered the industry and become significant producers. South 
Africa, a minor producer in the 1950s, also expanded its market share, as 
did New Caledonia, the second largest producer after Canada. 
In tin, the changes have occurred a t  a slower pace. World mine out- 
put has increased, but more modestly, and one does not find new coun- 
tries entering the industry and capturing a large share of world output. 
Still, shifts have taken place. In particular, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Bolivia have suffered a decline in their market shares, while the Soviet 
Union, Thailand, and Australia have garnered larger shares. Also, in Bri- 
tain, where men have for centuries dug for tin, the long hstorical decline 
in comparative advantage has been reversed in the postwar period. 
In zinc, the largest producer in 1950, the United States, accounted 
for over a fourth of world output. By 1980, i ts  market share had fallen to 
six percent. Mexico, Italy, and Zaire also suffered reductions. In con- 
trast,  Canada increased its share of world production from 13 to 17 per- 
cent, and in the process became the world's leading producer, though the 
Soviet Union whose market share almost tripled over the period was by 
1980 a close second. 
WMe all the metals just considered display some shf t s  in compara- 
tive advantage over the postwar period, and surprismgly pronounced 
shifts in the case of bauxite, iron ore, and nickel, one does not find that  
these changes consistently favor the developing countries. As a group, 
the developing countries did increase their share of world iron ore and 
nickel prod.uction. Their share of total copper and zinc output, however, 
remained the same, and for bauxite and tin it actually declined 
Among the developed countries, it is true that the market shares of 
the more industrialized states have fallen for those metals where these 
countries are,  or were, important ore producers. The share of world out- 
put coming from the United States, for example, decreased appreciably 
for all the metals examined except nickel and tin which the country has 
never produced in great quantities. Where the Western European coun- 
tries and Japan are significant producers, as in the case of France for 
iron ore and bauxite, their market shares l k e  those of the United States 
have tended to decline. These reductions, however, have been completely 
offset in bauxite and partially offset in copper, iron ore, nickel, and zinc 
by increases in market shares by Australia, Canada, and South Africa. 
The socialist countries have over the last 30 years seen their share of 
world mine production fall for bauxite, remain about the same for nickel, 
and rise for copper, iron ore, tin, and zinc. Most of the increases for 
these last four commodities occurred during the 1950s. The Soviet Union 
is the principal producer in t h s  group, and its mine output largely deter- 
mines the performance of the socialist countries as a group. However, 
other socialist countries have had some influence: Hungary accentuated 
the decline in bauxite, Poland the rise in copper, and China the increase 
in copper, iron ore, tin, and zinc. 
This short survey of trends in mine production raises the question of 
why the market shares of the major producing countries have so often 
changed, a t  times abruptly and substantially, over the last three decades. 
The search for an  answer begins in the next section with a brief examina- 
tion of international trade theory. Research in this field has long been 
concerned with the underlying causes of comparative advantage, and 
should be of some help in explaining international differences in metal 
mining. 
International Trade Theory 
The reasons why some countries produce and export certain goods, 
while other countries import these goods and export others, has 
interested economists for centuries. Modern explanations found in the 
pure theory of international trade are based on the doctrine of compara- 
tive costs developed by the classical economist David Ricardo over 150 
years ago.2 Ths  doctrine maintains that states will produce and export 
those commodities whose domestic costs of production are low relative to 
other products when compared with production costs in other countries. 
For example, if in the absence of trade, a particular basket of food 
cost two dollars and a given basket of clot- ten dollars to produce in 
the United States and 800 yen and 2,000 yen in Japan, food would be rela- 
tively less expensive in the United States. A basket of food would require 
only 20 percent of the cost of producing a basket of clothing, compared 
to 40 percent in Japan. As a result, the United States would tend to 
export food to Japan and receive clothing in return. Trade between the 
two countries could occur even though one country might be more effi- 
cient (and so possess an absolute advantage) in the production of both 
commodities, in the sense that its production requires less capital, labor, 
and other inputs. All that is required for trade is that the dollar-yen 
exchange rate be set so that it is cheaper for the United States to buy 
clothing from Japan than to produce it domestically ( that  is, the dollar 
must be worth more than 200 yen), and cheaper for Japan to buy Ameri- 
can food than to produce it domestically (that is, the dollar must be 
worth less than 400 yen). 
The doctrine of comparative costs is just the first step in explaining 
comparative advantage. For i t  to be of use, it is necessary to understand 
what generates or accounts for differences in comparative costs. Why, in 
the preceding example, does Japan enjoy a comparative cost advantage in 
clothing and the United States in food? 
The classical economists were the first to answer t h s  question. They 
maintained that  differences in labor productivity were responsible. A 
farmer in the United States might produce three times the amount of 
food in a day as a farmer in Japan because of more favorable terrain, 
larger scale operations, and more Q h l y  mechanized farming techniques. 
Whereas American garment workers might produce only 50 percent more 
than their Japanese counterparts. While labor productivity can help 
explain differences in production costs, there are obviously other factors 
of production besides labor. 
In the 20th century, Jacob Viner, Gottfried Haberler, and other neoc- 
lassical writers have tried to rectify this shortcoming of the classical 
explanation. They contend that differences in total productivity, rather 
than just labor productivity, are responsible for international differences 
in comparative costs. Differences in total productivity arise, they sug- 
gest, because the production function for goods varies from one country 
to another. The Japanese may apply the same amount of labor, 
machnery, and fertilizer to their agricultural sector and still not reap 
the same output per farmer as in the United States because of Mfer- 
ences in weather conditions and land quality. 
A second explanation for differences in comparative costs is found in 
the factor endowment theory, advanced by the Swedish economists Eli 
Hechscher and Bertil Ohlin in the early years of the 20th century. Their 
theory maintains that international differences in production costs are 
due largely to differences between countries in the price of capital, labor, 
and other factors of production, which arise because countries enjoy dif- 
ferent factor endowments. The United States, for example, is well 
endowed with good farmland; Japan with people. Thus, the price of farm 
land in the United States is lower compared to labor than in Japan, and 
the United States enjoys a comparative cost advantage in the production 
of goods, such as food, that are land intensive. 
Since World War 11, other explanations for comparative costs have 
been proposed. These theories stress the importance of inter-country 
differences in technology, human capital, economies of scale, and domes- 
tic market  condition^.^ They are designed primarily to explain the large 
volume of trade that takes place between the industrialized countries in 
manufactured products. Whle differences in factor endowment and pro- 
ductivity do exist between these countries, they typically are small com- 
pared with those found between the developed and developing countries. 
Moreover, developed countries with apparently similar domestic condi- 
tions, such as those of Western Europe, often import substantial quanti- 
ties of similar finished goods from each other. Ths has produced consid- 
erable uneasiness over Lhe validity and usefulness of the neoclassical and 
factor endowment theories in explaining trade between such countries in 
automobiles, farm machnery, computers, and other manufactured pro- 
ducts. 
This dissatisfaction, however, does not extend to trade in primary 
products. Here, one still finds widespread acceptance of the factor 
endowment theory as the most useful explanation for international differ- 
ences in production costs. In the case of metals and other mineral pro- 
ducts, the applicability of the factor endowment theory appears almost 
self-evident. In the words of Haberler (1977, p. 4): 
The most obvious factors that explain a good deal of interna- 
tional trade are 'natural resources1--land of different quhlity 
(including climatic conditions), mineral deposits, etc. No 
sophisticated theory is required to explain why Kuwait exports 
oil, Bolivia tin, Brazil coffee and Portugal wine. Because of the 
deceptive obviousness of many of these cases economists have 
spent comparatively little time on 'natural resource trade.' 
So Bolivia exports tin, Chle copper, and Jamaica bauxite because they 
are well endowed with these resources. Intuitively, at  least, the 
hypothesis that mineral endowment is the overriding determinant of com- 
parative advantage in metal production is very appealiu.  The next sec- 
tion examines this hypothesis more closely. 
Mineral Endowment 
Canada is the world's leading producer of nickel. Presumably t h s  
country is well endowed with. nickel, but just how much nickel does it 
have? How does its endowment compare with that of New Caledonia, 
Indonesia, and other nickel producing countries? More generally, is there 
a close correlation between a country's endowment of nickel, or any 
other metal, and its production as the factor endowment theory con- 
tends? 
Measures of Mineral Endowment 
Before such questions can be answered, it is necessary to measure 
the mineral endowment that countries possess. There are several meas- 
ures available for the purpose.4 One possibility is mineral reserves. 
Reserves indicate the metal contained in deposits that are both known 
(discovered) and profitable to mine, given existing metal prices and pro- 
cessing costs. 
A second measure is mineral resources. Resources include reserves 
plus the metal contained in deposits that would become reserves under 
specific conditions, such as the doubling of a metal's price or the 
discovery of all unknown deposits. Thus, resources give some indication 
of how reserves would change in the future assuming the specified con&- 
tions came to pass. 
While reserves are difficult enough to measure accurately, the prob- 
lems of estimating resources are far greater. Nevertheless, many efforts 
have been made and continue to be made to do so. These studies fall into 
two groups. The first attempts to indicate how the reserves of a metal 
found in known deposits increase as price rises (or production costs 
decline). The U.S. Bureau of Mines, for example, has estimated that the 
copper profitable to recover from known U.S. deposits increases from 11 
to over 70 million tons as the price of copper rises from 0.50 to 2.00 
(1978) dollars per pound.5 The second set of resource studies focuses on 
the possible additions to reserves arising from new discoveries. The U.S. 
Geological Survey, for instance, has estimated that if all the copper depo- 
sits profitable to mine under existing economic, technological, and politi- 
cal conditions were found, copper reserves would increase in the United 
States by 57 percent and in the world by over 1000 percent (Erickson, 
1973). Other studies in t h s  group go further, in the sense that they 
attempt to estimate not only what exists but also how much of what exists 
is likely to be found. 6 
A third possible measure of mineral endowment is the resource base. 
This measure estimates the total quantity of a metal found in the earth's 
crust, and so reflects the ultimate physical endowment of the metal that 
a country possesses. It encompasses reserves and resources, and much 
more. While the copper reserves and resources of the United States were 
estimated a t  78 and 122 million tons in 1973, the country's copper 
resource base totaled 45 trillion tons--more than 500,000 times reserves 
(Erickson, 197.3). Unlike reserves and resources, this measure does not 
change over time, except for the relatively small quantities that are actu- 
ally mined. It includes metals contained in discovered and undiscovered, 
as well as profitable and unprofitable, deposits. Indeed, it includes the 
metal found in common rock and other deposits of such poor quality that 
their production costs exceed by many multiples current prices. 
All of the preceding measures provide estimates--and greatly dif- 
ferent estimates--of mineral endowment for the world and for individual 
countries. Each has its own set of uses. For explaining comparative 
advantage and international differences in metal production, reserves 
appear most appropriate. For before production can take place, a 
mineral deposit must be discovered and developed, and only those depo- 
sits considered profitable are likely to be developed. Thus, while the 
resource base and particularly resources may influence future metal pro- 
duction, only metal endowments that are known and profitable to mine 
can affect current and past production. 
It is important to note, however, that reserves are not fixed, but 
rather change as new discoveries occur, new technologies develop, and 
other conditions vary. As a consequence, to the extent comparative 
advantage in metal production rests on mineral endowment as measured 
by reserves, i t  may shift from one set  of countries to another over time. 
Were the resource base the appropriate measure of endowment, once a 
relationshp between it and metal production were demonstrated, the 
analyst could consider his job finished, for the resource base of any coun- 
try is for all practical purposes fixed. Since this is not the case for 
reserves, finding a significant relationship between reserves and metal 
production simply raises another question: what forces determine the 
level of a country's reserves and cause that level to change over time? 
Ths  important question is considered below, but first the relationshp 
between reserves and production found among the major metal produc- 
ing countries is examined. 
Reserves a n d  Mine Production 
Following the  discovery of a new deposit, a number of years a r e  
needed t o  bring it into commercial production. A U.S .  Bureau of Mines 
study of eleven metal  ore deposits in the United States,  for example, finds 
tha t  the time from discovery t o  production for the nine mines tha t  are  or 
soon will be operating varies from four t o  13 years,  and averages slightly 
7 over eight years (Gries, 1979, p. 3). T h s  gestation period arises because 
it takes time to  conduct feasibility studies, plan the  development, 
arrange the  financing, negotiate with local governments over taxation and 
other mat te rs ,  deal with the  legal challenges raised by environmental 
organizations and other  groups, s t r ip  the overburden for a n  open pit mine 
or sink the shafts for a n  underground mine, e rec t  concentrators,  con- 
s t ruct  transportation facilities, and carry out numerous other s teps often 
involved in bringing a new mine into operation. If the mine is located 
abroad, it may also be  necessary to  build a town site and new port facili- 
ties, and perhaps work with the host government as  a par tner  in  the pro- 
ject. 
The time interval between discovery and production suggests t ha t  in  
s ea rchng  for a relat ionshp between the reserves and mine output of 
countries one should expect t he  discovery of new reserves to  produce a n  
increase in  output only after a lag of some years.  It is for t h s  reason tha t  
the  1960 mine output of t he  major producing countries of bauxite, 
copper, iron, nickel, t in,  and zinc is compared in Figures la-f with their 
1970--not 1960--reserves. Similar da ta  for 1950 and 1960 are  also shown 
t o  indicate how the relat ionshp between these two variables has  evolved 
over t ime. 
Before examining these figures, it is important to note that accurate 
data on reserves are difficult to obtain, for they require comparable esti- 
mates from around the world on the amount of metal known to exist and 
profitable to exploit that is found in deposits being worked as well as 
those still undeveloped. Such information is gathered and processed by a 
variety of private and public organizations whose thoroughness and pro- 
cedures are not always the same. Consequently, one cannot be certain 
that reported figures are consistent among countries or even over time 
for the same country. This is particularly likely to be a problem for those 
metals, such as iron ore, that are found in a relatively large number of 
deposits and countries. Reserves for the socialist countries may also be 
subject to relatively large errors, since information is often more difficult 
to obtain for these countries. 8 
Despite these problems, it is still useful to examine the relationship 
between reserves and mine output. Beginning with bauxite in the 1970s, 
one finds in the upper half of Figure l a  a tendency for 1980 production to 
increase with 1970 reserves. Guinea and Australia with the largest 
reserves are the largest producers, while Guyana, France, Greece, and 
the United States with reserves under 100 million tons all produce less 
than a million tons of bauxite. 9 
The solid line drawn in F ~ u r e  l a  shows the linear relationship 
between bauxite production and reserves for developed and developing 
countries estimated by regression analysis. Although the amount of 
trade be tween the socialist. countries and the market economy countries 
has been growing in recent years, historically such trade has been quite 
limited. As a result mine production in the socialist countries has 
responded primarily to the demand of socialist countries, while mine pro- 
duction in the market economy countries has responded to the demand 
of these countries. Under such circumstances, one would not necessarily 
expect the same relationship between reserves and mine production to 
exist in the socialist countries, and so they were excluded in estimating 
the relationship be tween these two variables. 10 
The major producing countries from the socialist group are, however, 
shown in F~gures la-f, allowing one to determine whether the socialist 
countries produce more or less relative to their reserves than other 
major producing countries. With bauxite, for example, the output of the 
Soviet Union, the only major producer among the socialist countries, is 
higher than one would expect to find in market economy countries with 
comparable reserves. 
The equation for the estimated relationship between 1980 production 
and 1970 reserves is also shown in the upper half of Figure la. The coeffi- 
cient for the reserves variable (X), whch gives the slope of the regression 
line, implies that an increase in reserves of one mihon tons raises the 
expected production of a country by 3.7 thousand (.0037 million) tons. 
Beneath t h s  coefficient in parentheses is its standard error (.0009). An 
asterisk is placed after the coefficient if, as in the case of bauxite, the 
coefficient is statistically significant at or above the customary 95 per- 
cent probability level.'' Ths means that it is hghly unlikely-less than 
five chances out of a hundred-that the estimated positive relationshp 
between 1970 bauxite reserves and 1980 mine production is due to mere 
chance. 
Another important statistic in Flgure la is the coefficient of determi- 
2 nation (R ). Its value of .71 implies that 71 percent of the variation 
among market economy countries in bauxite production can be attri- 
buted to or explained by variations in the size of their reserves. The fig- 
ure also shows the number of countries (n) used in calculating the rela- 
tionship between production and reserves, and the share of world output 
outside the socialist countries provided by these countries (S). In the 
case of bauxite, the nine countries identified in the flgure produced 89 
percent of the bauxite mined in the market economy during 1980. 12 
The significant relationshp between bauxite production and reserves 
supports the factor endowment theory and the hypothesis that mineral 
endowment measured by reserves is an important determinant of com- 
parative advantage in bauxite mining. Still, the fact that 29 percent of 
the inter-country variation in production is not explained by reserves 
should not be overlooked, for it suggests that other factors also affect 
bauxite production and comparative advantage in t h s  activity. 
Turning next to copper, one finds in Figure 1b that nine countries 
accounted for 87 percent of ore mined in 1980 in the developed and 
developing countries. The estimated relationship between 1970 reserves 
and 1980 mine production is even stronger than that found for bauxite. 
Expected copper mine output increases by 15 thousand tons per year for 
every million'ton increase in reserves. The small standard error for t h s  
coefficient means the positive relationship between reserves and produc- 
tion is statistically significant, and the coefficient of determination sug- 
gests that 94 percent of the variation among countries in copper mine 
production can be attributed to differences in their reserves. Still, the 
figure does show that Canada and Chle produce somewhat more copper 
ore than expected on the basis of its reserves, and Peru somewhat less. 
I t  also indicates that  the Soviet Union mines considerably more copper 
relative to its reserves than major producers outside the socialist group. 
In iron ore, ten countries contributed 89 percent of 1980 world out- 
put outside the socialist countries. The estimated relationship between 
reserves and production indicates that a country's expected iron ore pro- 
duction increases by 3.4 thousand tons for every million ton increase in 
reserves. Again, the standard error for this coefficient is small enough to 
make t h s  positive relationship statistically significant, and thus not likely 
the result of mere chance. According to the coefficient of determination, 
reserves account for 65 percent of the inter-country differences in pro- 
duction. Still, Canada, France, and Venezuela produce less iron ore than 
expected on the basis of their reserves, while the United states and Aus- 
traha produce more. China is also found above the regression line, indi- 
cating that  it mines more relative to reserves than is typical of the major 
non-socialist producers. The Soviet Union, on the  other hand, mines 
somewhat less than expected, even though it is by far the world's largest 
iron ore producer. 
In nickel, Canada, New Caledonia, and six smaller producers includ- 
ing Cuba (which is counted among the developing countries) produced 85 
percent of the total output of nickel ore outside the socialist countries in 
1980. An increase in reserves of a million tons raises expected mine pro- 
duction by 3.1 thousand tons. The probability that t h s  finding is the 
result of mere chance, however, is h g h e r  than in the previous cases, for 
the coefficient of the reserve variable is statistically significant a t  only 
the 70 percent probability level rather than the 95 percent level. The 
coefficient of determination indicates that 11 percent of the differences 
among countries in mine production can be explained by their reserves. 
Australia and particularly Canada produce much more than their 
reserves would lead one to expect, while Cuba, the Philippines, and the 
Dominican Republic produce less. The Soviet Union mines more nickel 
relative to its reserves than is typical of the major non-socialist producing 
countries. 
A second regression, whch excludes Cuba, is shown in Figure Id by 
the broken line. For two reasons, a reestimation of the relationship 
between production and reserves without Cuba seems desifable. First, 
Cuban reserves for 1970, and perhaps 1950 as well, may have been sub- 
stantially overestimated. As Appendix Table 2d shows, the country's 
reserves for 1980 are  less than 20 percent the levels reported earlier. 
While world reserves did decline somewhat between 1970 and 1980, t h s  
was due largely to the drop in Cuban reserves and cannot explain the 
latter.  Second, the Castro revolution in Cuba in the late 1950s led to 
close political ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. 
This realignment severed the financial and other connections the Cuban 
nickel industry had with the United States, and adversely affected the 
country's production and exports. 
When Cuba is excluded, a million ton increase in reserves produces 
an  expected rise in mine output of 6.4 thousand tons, rather  than 3.1 
thousand tons, and t h s  coefficient is significant a t  the 90 percent level. 
The new results also indicate that  31 percent, as opposed to 11 percent, 
of the variation in country production can be explained by reserves. 
In tin, ten countries produced 91 percent of the non-socialist output 
in 1980. The estimated relationsbp for these countries indicates that an 
increase in reserves of a million tons leads to an anticipated rise in pro- 
duction of 31.5 thousand tons, a figure whch is statistically significant a t  
the 95 percent probability level. Nearly 50 percent of the variation in 
country production can be explained by reserves. f i l e  Malaysia and to a 
lesser extent Indonesia and Bolivia produce far more than expected, Thai- 
land produces less. Among the socialist countries, the Soviet Union mines 
more tin than predicted by the regression line, and China somewhat less. 
In zinc, nine countries accounted for 72 percent of the zinc mined in 
1980 outside the socialist countries. The estimated regression indicates 
an additional output of 20.6 thousand tons is associated with an increase 
in reserves of one million tons, and that t h s  relationsbp is statistically 
s~gnificant. Although Canada, Peru, and Australia mine more zinc than 
expected and the United states less, half of the inter-country variation in 
the output can be attributed to differences in reserves. The Soviet Union, 
by far the most important producer among the socialist countries, mines 
considerably more zinc, given its reserves, than is typical of the major 
developed and developing countries. Other important socialist 
countries-Poland, North Korea, and Chna-produce approximately what 
one would expect or somewhat less. 
The persistently positive relationship found in the 1970s between 
reserves and production raises the question of whether t h s  relationsbp 
has been growing stronger over the postwar period. If so, t b s  would sug- 
gest that other determinants of comparative advantage in mineral pro- 
duction have been declining in importance, and that in the future, 
particularly if t b s  trend were to continue, one would be able to forecast 
the mine production of countries some years hence on the basis of 
current reserves. An indication of how the relationshp between reserves 
and production has evolved in recent years can be obtained by comparing 
1950 reserves with 1960 production and contrasting the results, whch are 
shown on the right hand side of Figures la-f, with those just discussed. 
Not surprisingly, the findings vary depending on the metal. 
For bauxite, a hlghly significant, positive relationship between pro- 
duction and reserves existed in the 1950s, just as in the 1970s. While 
Surinam produced appreciably more than expected and Greece less, 80 
percent of the variation among countries in production is explained by 
differences in reserves, which is somewhat hlgher than the 71 percent fig- 
ure for the 1970s. 
For copper, too, a hlghly significant, positive relationshp existed 
between production and reserves in the 1950s. Whle Canada lies appreci- 
ably above the estimated regression line for that period and Zaire and 
Chile below it, 87 percent of the inter-country differences in production 
can be explained by reserves. This is only slightly less than the high 94 
percent recorded for the 1970s. 
In iron ore, unlike bauxite and copper, a slgnificant relationshp 
between production and reserves did not exist in the 1950s. The horizon- 
tal slope of the regression line implies that the level of a country's 
reserves had little or no influence on its mine production. The United 
States and France were by far the largest producers among the non- 
socialist countries, even though their reserves were substantially less 
than those of lndia and Brazil. The world's largest producer was the 
Soviet Union, whose reserves were little more than those of the United 
States. Thus, over the postwar period a positive and statistically slgnifi- 
cant relationshp be tween iron ore reserves and production has developed 
where none existed in the 1950s. 
In nickel, a similar, though somewhat weaker, trend appears to be 
taking place if Cuba is considered in estimating the relationshp between 
production and reserves. In the 1950s there is no evidence that produc- 
tion increased with reserves. By the 1970s several new countries had 
begun mining nickel, and the output of the major producers appears to 
be somewhat influenced by their reserves. 
If Cuba is excluded, and as pointed out earlier there are good rea- 
sons for doing so, one finds a positive, though statistically insignificant 
relationshp between 1950 reserves and 1960 production for the remain- 
ing countries. Over the next twenty years t h s  relationshpgrows some- 
what stronger, and as noted earlier is significant a t  the 90 percent proba- 
bility level by the 1970s. 
In tin, the relationshp between production and reserves was b h l y  
significant in the 1950s, and has remained so since. However, reserves 
accounted for only 47 percent of the differences in production among the 
major non-socialist producers in the 1970s compared to 05 percent in the 
1950s. 
In zinc, the relationship between reserves and production for the 
major producers outside the socialist group was negative and insignifi- 
cant in the 1950s, and little or none of the differences in their output 
could be explained by reserves. By the 1970s the relationshp was signifi- 
cant and positive, and could account for 53 percent of the intercountry 
differences in production. 
Thus, for those metals, such as zinc, iron ore, and possibly nickel, 
where reserves had little or no influence on mine production in the 1950s, 
a relationship between these two variables has developed over the last 
several decades. For those metals, such as bauxite, copper, and tin, 
where production was already tied to reserves in the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  t b s  relation- 
ship has persisted. So by the 1970s reserves appeared to  be an  important 
determinant of comparative advantage in mine production for all of the 
metals examined, as the factor endowment theory would suggest. 
Determinants of Reserves 
This finding implies that one must examine changes in country 
reserves-and the underlying forces responsible for these changes--to 
understand the substantial shifts in mining that have occurred in recent 
years. Reserves for bauxite, copper, iron, nickel, tin, and zinc for indivi- 
dual countries, groups of countries, and the world are shown in Appendix 
Tables 2a-f for selected years over the 1950-1980 period. As pointed out 
earlier, the information on reserves is not completely consistent among 
countries and over time. Consequently, these tables must be interpreted 
with caution. Nevertheless, they do provide some indication of the major 
shifts in reserve holdings over the last 30 years. 
Surprising, none of the six major metals considered exhibits a signifi- 
cant decline in the share of world reserves held by developed countries. 
The combined reserves of these countries have remained at  about 35 per- 
cent of the world total for both copper and iron ore, and have increased 
for the other commodities-from 12 to 23 percent for bauxite, from 14 to 
26 percent for nickel, from 2 to 7 percent for tin, and from 56 to 71 per- 
cent for zinc. Such figures provide little support for the widespread 
belief that  the developed world is becoming increasingly dependent on 
the mineral wealth of developing countries as its own reserves are 
exhausted. 
Within the developed countries, however, the location of reserves has 
shifted. The shares of the United States and other industrialized coun- 
tries have fallen, while those of Australia, Canada, and South Africa have 
grown. Thls suggests that the industrialized countries may have to rely 
more heavily on mineral imports, but that  these imports are likely to 
come increasingly from other developed rather than developing coun- 
tries. 
The developing countries have seen their share of world reserves 
increasefor bauxite from 66 to 73 percent, and remain about the same for 
copper a t  52 percent. For the other metals considered, their share has 
declined--from 55 to  32 percent for iron ore, from 06 to 60 percent for 
nickel, from 73 to 68 percent for tin. and from 28 to 19 percent for zinc. 
Within this group, significant changes have also occurred in favor of the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, New Caledonia, and Guinea, and against 
Zambia, Zaire, Malaysia, Cuba, ln&a, and Jamaica. 13 
In the socialist countries, reserves have grown from zero to 13 per- 
cent of the world total for nickel and from 11 to 33 percent for iron ore, 
but have fallen from 22 to 3 percent for bauxite and from 16 to 10 per- 
cent for zinc. Copper reserves climbed from 13 to 24 percent during the 
1950s, but by 1980 were back down to 12 percent. Conversely, tin 
reserves as a percentage of the world total declined during the 1950s and 
1960s, and then recovered during the 1970s reachng their 1950 level of 
25 percent in 1980. 
The reserves held by individual countries and country groups may 
change over time for three reasons: (1) the exploitation of known deposits 
tends to deplete reserves; (2) changes in technology, metal prices, and 
the cost of factors of production may increase or decrease reserves; and 
(3) the discovery of new deposits adds to reserves. 
Mining consumes a country's reserves, and thus tends over time to 
reduce them. Eventually, a mineral deposit is exhausted. In practice, 
this tendency is often partially offset, and a t  times entirely offset, by 
development work that occurs a t  operating mines. Most firms are reluc- 
tant to  incur the expense of proving the reserves of new prospects beyond 
the equivalent of 20 to 30 years of production. Further development work 
is postponed until the mine is in production, when operating revenues can 
be used to support the search for more reserves. At some sites, a foot of 
diamond drilling is then carried out for each ton of ore mined. At other 
properties, similar rules of thumb are followed. As a result, new additions 
to reserves slow the decline over time in the ratio of reserves to annual 
production. This explains why many mines continue to operate long 
beyond their initial life expectancy. 
Nevertheless, countries do deplete their reserves and in the process 
lose their comparative advantage in metal production. The decline of 
bauxite in the United States, for example, can be attributed in part to the 
exhaustion of known deposits. 
It is far from inevitable, however, that  major mining countries will 
find their reserves declining over time. Indeed, as Appendix Tables 2a-f 
illustrate, very few countries have suffered an absolute reduction in 
mineral reserves over the postwar period. Part of the explanation is that 
many known deposits in the early postwar period, whlch were not then 
economical to mine, have since become so due to (a) an  increase in metal 
prices, (b) a fall in mining and processing costs, or (c) a decline in tran- 
sportation costs 
The prices of most metal products have risen over the last several 
decades, even after adjusting for inflation. Zinc was the only major metal 
considered whose real price fell between 1950 and 1980. I t  declined by 9 
percent. Real prices rose by 17. percent for aluminum, 17 percent for 
copper, 75 percent for steel, 94 percent for nickel, and 112 percent for 
tin.14 Such increases add to reserves by mahng previously marginal 
deposits profitable to exploit. 
The cost of mining and processing metals may fall over time for two 
reasons. First, the cost of factors of production used in producing 
metals, such as energy, can decline. Over much of the postwar period, 
the real price of energy did fall, though tlus favorable trend came to a n  
abrupt end in the 1970s as a result of the OPEC oil cartel and other 
developments. Second, and more important, processing costs may 
decline because of technological developments. In mining, larger trucks, 
shovels, and other earth moving equipment have been introduced, and 
better blasting techniques developed. New technology has pushed costs 
down as well a t  the concentration, smelting, refining and fabrication 
stages of production. 
New processes have also allowed the winnmg of metals from com- 
pletely new types of ores. The economic extraction of iron from taconite, 
for example, helped prevent a decline in U.S. iron ore reserves over the 
postwar period. Similarly, new technologies facilitating the commercial 
exploitation of laterite deposits greatly expanded nickel reserves in the 
Dominican Republic and elsewhere. 
Transportation costs have fallen substantially over the last 30 years 
as a consequence of larger ore carriers, more automated port facilities, 
and other advances. The dramatic impact of these developments on the 
cost of shlpping iron ore is highlighted by McDivitt and Manners (1974, pp. 
36-38): l5  
The charge for moving ore between Brazil and Japan in the mid- 
dle 1950s ranged between $16 and $20 per ton . , . . With the 
introduction of oil/ore carriers on a quadrangular trade in the 
late 1960s, the rate fell yet further to 84 per ton. Such a fall 
from $20 to  $4 mlght represent an  extreme case; yet declines of 
50 and 60 percent in iron ore freight rates on particular runs 
are not difficult to find in the period 1950 to 1970. 
The decreases for other mineral commodities are typically smaller, 
for seldom can the firms in these industries slup their output in the quan- 
tities required to fill giant ore vessels and realize the resulting economies 
of scale (Wittur, 1974, pp. 153-155). Still, new developments have lowered 
shipping costs in other metal industries as well, albeit on a somewhat 
smaller scale. 
In addition, for some countries the rise of nearby markets has 
reduced mineral transportation costs. During the 1960s and early 1970s, 
for example. Japan enjoyed extremely rapid economic growth, and nearby 
producing countries found the cost of shipping mineral products declined 
as Japan replaced Western Europe and the United States as their major 
market. 
The fall in the per ton-mile cost of shipping bulk commodities and 
the rise of Japan have particularly helped producing countries in the Far 
East, such as Australia, Indonesia, New Caledonia, and the Philippines. 
This is one reason why the share of world reserves held by these countries 
has increased in recent years for many metals. 
Changes in technology, metal prices, production costs, and transpor- 
tation costs can reduce reserves as well as increase them. The rapid 
adoption of the basic oxygen furnace in the production of steel, for exam- 
ple, initially increased the preference for iron ores with low phosphorous 
content (Manners, 1971, p. 49). Ths adversely affected the price of high 
phosphorous ores found in the Benelux countries, France, and Sweden, 
and contributed to the slow growth of reserves in these countries during 
the 1960s. 
Similarly, fallmg metal prices have on occasion forced mines to close 
and turned ore into worthless rock. Increases in construction costs, 
interest rates, energy costs, and environmental costs have at times 
pushed production costs up in certain countries; and now and then tran- 
sportation costs have risen. All such developments tend to reduce 
reserves. 
The t h r d  reason for changes in reserves is the discovery of previ- 
ously unknown deposits. New discoveries are the product of exploration 
whch is largely carried out by private firms, particularly the multina- 
tional mining corporations. Just what factors firms consider in decidmg 
how much to spend on exploration, where to  look, and what types of 
mineral deposits on whch to concentrate is far from clear. Presumably 
firms undertake exploration because they anticipate a financial return 
from this activity. The expected profit depends on the probability of fmd- 
ing one or more deposits, and their value once found. These two con- 
siderations depend on geological, geographcal, economic, and political 
factors. 
Looking first a t  the geological factors, one finds that  economic depo- 
sits contain metal in far greater concentration than is found in common 
rock. The cutoff grades for aluminum and iron ore deposits are 2.2 and 
3.4  times the average crustal abundance of these metals (Cook, 1976, p. 
678). For other metals, the ratio of cutoff grade to  crustal abundance is 
far hgher .  I t  is, for example, 56 for copper, 100 for nickel, 370 for zinc, 
and 2000 for tin. 
A number of other considerations are also important in determining 
whether a deposit is worth developing. The presence of valuable bypro- 
ducts, such as gold or silver, may allow the mining of a copper deposit 
below the normal cutoff grade, while a deposit containing arsenic or other 
costly impurities may not be economic even though it exceeds the cutoff 
grade. The size of the deposit can also be important. Porphyry ore 
bodies averaging less than 0.5 percent copper can be profitably mined 
because they are large enough to  reap the substantial economies of scale 
that can be realized with modern mining, processing, and infrastructure 
facilities, whle hlgher grade but smaller massive sulfide deposits remain 
too costly. Deposits located close to the surface are also l~kely to be more 
economic than deeper, but otherwise comparable, deposits, since surface 
mining with an open pit is generally cheaper than underground mining. 
Another important factor is the nature of the ore. Nickel from laterite 
deposits costs more to produce than nickel from sulfide ores, even when 
the grade is similar, because laterite ores cannot be concentrated and so 
must be entirely treated by relatively expensive pyrometallurgical or 
hydrometallurgical techniques. 
Specific geological conditions are required to create ore bodies with 
the grade and other qualities necessary to make them profitable. As a 
result, such deposits are not uniformly &stributed over the earth's crust, 
but are concentrated where the necessary geological conditions once 
existed. Consequently, companies tend to focus their exploration on 
those areas appearing most favorable in terms of their geological hstory. 
In practice, t h s  often means those regions where deposits have been 
discovered in the past. The western parts of the United States and 
Canada, for example, are much more heavily explored for porphyry 
copper deposits than other parts of these countries. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that f~ rms  consider only 
geological factors in allocating their exploration expenditures. For com- 
panies, no matter how favorable the geological potential, will not spend 
significant sums of money looking for bauxite in areas distant from port 
facilities. The low value of bauxite and the h g h  cost of shpping it over 
land generally means even a good deposit located far inland is 
uneconomic. Similarly, in the past, the high cost of shipping bauxite, iron 
ore, and other low value ores and concentrates discouraged exploration 
in countries, such as Australia, situated far from the main markets. As 
pointed out above, however, this situation has recently changed in 
response to the falling costs of shpping bulk commodities and the rapid 
growth of the Japanese market. 
Another important geographcal consideration is the availability of 
infrastructure. The mining and processing of metals requires the move- 
ment of substantial quantities of materials. Ths calls for a transporta- 
tion network that often includes roads, railroads, and port facilities. In 
addition, metal production requires people, and they need schools, power 
facilities, homes, stores, churches, sewers, recreation facilities, and all 
the other amenities required .to make a townsite. Where such facilities 
already exist, either because mining is being carried on in the region or 
because other industrial activities are there, the costs of developing a 
new mine are far less. For example, Driver (1972, p. 67) has estimated 
that the costs of developing an open pit copper mine in a remote area, 
such as northern Canada, may run as much as 75 percent above the costs 
of a comparable mine in an established copper mining region, such as 
Arizona. As a result, other things being equal, firms have an incentive to 
concentrate exploration on those areas where a heavy investment in 
infrastructure is not necessary. 
Changes in technological and economic conditions also affect 
exploration. It was pointed out earlier that shifts in processing costs and 
metal prices can influence a country's reserves by malung marginal 
deposits either profitable or unprofitable to exploit. Such changes can 
likewise affect exploration. For example, as rising nickel prices and new 
processing technologies made laterite deposits a more attractive source 
of nickel during the 1950s and.l960s, firms became interested in explor- 
ing for such deposits in countries such as Australia and Indonesia, where 
the conditions were favorable. More recently, this interest has waned as 
rising energy costs and depressed nickel prices has made the mining of 
most laterite deposits unprofitable. 
Finally, exploration is influenced by political conditions. Where taxa- 
tion and other government policies favor the mining industry, as was the 
case in Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United States over the 
1950-1970 period, the value of any new discovery is enhanced. Tkls 
increases the incentive to carry out exploration in such locations. Alter- 
natively, unfavorable government policies discourage exploration. After a 
long kustory of preferential treatment toward the mining sector, Canada 
in the early 1970s sharply increased mineral taxes. A conflict between 
the federal and provincial governments over the division of mining taxes 
exacerbated the situation, and in some provinces mining firms found 
their effective rate of taxation actually exceeded 100 percent of profits. 
The consequences were dramatic. Canadian mining firms conducted 60 
percent of their exploration outside the country in 1975, compared to 
only 20 percent in 1971 (DeYoung, 1976, p. 33). 
Political stability is also important. Coups, riots, and war can inter- 
rupt the production and transportation of ores. They can also make it dif- 
ficult to retain hlghly skilled workers and managers from abroad. Firms 
have little incentive to look for new deposits in countries where the likeli- 
hood of such events is a h .  
More on the importance of political factors is found in the next sec- 
tion. The focus there, however, is on the impact of the political environ- 
ment on mine development rather than exploration. 
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Other Determinants of Mine Production 
Wke reserves, and in turn the various factors effecting changes in 
reserves, significantly influence mine production, some countries pro- 
duced much more or less than expected on the basis of their mineral 
reserves alone. Canada, for example, mines more nickel than antici- 
pated, and Cuba much less. Australia and Jamaica mine more bauxite 
than expected, and Guinea and Brazil much less. These deviations imply 
that other important determinants of mine production exist and need to 
be considered. 
Other Factors of Production 
Mining involves more than just good deposits. The drills, trucks, 
crushers, rod mills, shafts, infrastructure, and other necessary facilities 
require capital, usually in large amounts. In addition, labor is needed to 
run and maintain the equipment, and to provide the necessary technical 
and managerial skills. Energy and material supplies are also essential. 
However, these factors are relatively mobile. The major mining firms 
have for many years been willing to take their capital along with their 
managerial and technical expertise to remote corners of the world to 
develop and operate new mines, as long as the political risks were not too 
great. As a result, international &fferences in the endowment of capital 
and expertise are of secondary importance in the location of mining facil- 
ities. Of greater significance are the legacy of past investment and the 
political environment. 
The Legacy of Past investment 
The capital invested in a mine cannot be recovered by closing down 
the facility. As a consequence, it pays to continue producing from an 
existing mine, rather than develop a new one, as long as the average out- 
of-pocket (variable) costs of production a t  that facility, including the cost 
of necessary repairs, are lower than the average total costs of a new 
mine. Since capital costs are normally a large part of total costs, once a 
mine is constructed it will generally not pay to replace it before the asso- 
ciated ore body is depleted.16 This means that changes in the geographic 
distribution of reserves and other developments affecting international 
differences in production costs will have their full impact on the location 
of mining only after a time lag equal to the life of existing mines. 
If the life expectancy of most mines were short, this would not slgni- 
ficantly retard the adjustment of production capacity and comparative 
advantage among metal mirung countries caused by changing conditions. 
But, as is well known, t h s  is not the case. Most major mines remain in 
operation for at  least 20 to 30 years, and some carry on for much longer. 
Many of the major copper mines developed in the 1920% for example, are 
still being worked today. Some are even producing more ore now than 
they did then. 
The long, productive lives of mines, coupled with the importance of 
capital costs, tend to prolong the dominance of established mining dis- 
tricts long after the conditions that promoted their rise have changed in 
favor of other producing areas. Moreover, this tendency is reinforced by 
two other considerations. First, as pointed out. earlier, new mines can be 
developed more cheaply in established mining areas where an adequate 
transportation system and other forms of infrastructure are already in 
place. Second, and somewhat related, it is often less expensive to create 
new capacity by expanding existing mines than by building new ones. At 
existing facilities, administrative and overhead costs typically do not rise 
in proportion to the increase in capacity. Thls may also hold for mainte- 
nance costs. In some cases, capacity can be increased by minor invest- 
ments that alleviate existing bottlenecks, rather than a complete replica- 
tion of existing mining facilities. 
The benefits of exploiting existing mines until they are exhausted, of 
developing new mines in established mining districts, and of adding new 
capacity by expanding existing facilities help explain why the United 
States mines considerably more iron ore and Canada more nickel than 
expected solely on the basis of their reserves. The large Malaysian output 
of tin may also be due in part to  such considerations, though t h s  is less 
'certain. Much tin mining is conducted by relatively small operators 
whose capital investment compared to other metal miners is limited. 
Consequently, they can more easily and quickly move into and out of min- 
ing. 
The rigidities introduced by past investment are greatest for those 
metals whose output is expanding slowly. Rapid growth requires the con- 
struction of new mines even though existing mines may not be in need of 
replacement, whch  accelerates the shift from traditional to new mining 
regions. For this reason, it is not surprising that the greatest changes in 
mine location are found for those metals, particularly aluminum, whose 
output has grown rapidly in recent years. 
Major changes in technology which lower mining costs but require a 
substantial investment in new facilities also tend to accelerate geographic 
shifts in mine production by shortening the life of older facilities. As do 
government regulations, such as environment restrictions, which are 
cheaper to comply with when building new mines than by modifying exist- 
ing mines. 
The Political Environment 
Just as the political environment can encourage or discourage 
exploration, it can affect investment in new mine capacity. Specifically, 
government policies and actions can change the expected costs, risks, 
and revenues associated with metal mining, and in the process alter the 
investment decisions of the multinational corporations and other com- 
panies accounting for most new investment in metal mining over the last 
several decades.'? Even the best metal deposits can be made too costly 
to mine through heavy taxation, royalties, exchange controls, environ- 
mental regulations, requirements to use domestic services and goods, 
and demands that domestic ores be processed internally. In addition, 
policies that promote widespread discontent domestically while suppress- 
ing peaceful change, as well as belligerent foreign policies, may 
encourage civil disruptions and war, and thereby raise the risks associ- 
ated with new mining ventures to an unacceptable level. 
The impact that public policies can have is illustrated by the shifting 
location of new iron ore mines since World War 11. Following the war, large 
American steel companies turned to Canada, Venezuela, and other forelgn 
countries to develop new iron ore mines. In part, t h s  move reflected con- 
cern over the depletion of high grade deposits in northern Minnesota, but 
another consideration was the desire to diversify sources of supply. Dur- 
ing and before the war, the industry depended heavily on ore from the 
Iron Range of Minnesota where the state and local communities near the 
mines imposed heavy taxes on the companies. By developing mines 
abroad, the companies increased their bargaining power vis-a-vis these 
governments, and thereby reduced their vulnerability to  high taxes 
(McDivitt and Manners, 1974, p. 47). 
Shortly after World War 11, U.S. Steel and Bethlehem established iron 
ore mining subsidiaries in Venezuela, and greatly increased their imports 
from these facilities during the 1950s. As a result, Venezuelan mine capa- 
city grew rapidly, and the country's output increased from 0.1 to 11.9 
million tons between 1950 and 1960 (Appendix Table lc) .  In the late 
1950s, however, a new government came to power in Venezuela. It 
claimed that the two American companies had substantially underpaid 
their taxes over the 1953-1958 period by understat~ng the value of their 
iron ore shipments from Venezuela. This provoked a dispute that dragged 
on for years encouraging both U.S. Steel and Bethlehem to  look elsewhere 
for their growing needs of iron ore.'' As a result, during the 1960s when 
iron ore capacity was growing rapidly in Canada, Brazil, and elsewhere, 
production in Venezuela stagnated. 
In the middle 1970s, the political climate changed once again. Sharp 
increases in taxes in Canada and Australia, along with other considera- 
tions, prompted American steel companies to look favorably once again 
on northern Minnesota and Michigan for their new investments in iron ore 
capacity (Hollister, 1978, Chap. 7). 
Not all government policies raise production costs. Indeed, on many 
occasions governments have subsidized mining by constructing necessary 
transportation facilities, granting generous tax holidays, providing inex- 
pensive electric power, and offering other benefits. For example, the 
Hanna nickel deposit a t  Riddle, Oregon, the only producing nickel mine in 
the United States would almost certainly not have been developed without 
the strong support of the U.S. government. The latter agreed in 1953 to 
build a smelter for the company's use at  a cost of 22 million dollars and 
to sell the smelter to the company at salvage value at  a later date. Hanna 
exercised t h s  option in 1961, paying only 1.7 million dollars (Cameron, 
1977, pp. 171-174). Tbs greatly reduced the firm's capital costs, a major 
component of the total costs of producing nickel. 
Nor is the Hanna experience unique. In the 1950s, the French 
government built a new dam at Yate in their colony of New Caledonia to 
provide the power for the electric furnaces being instaIled by Societe Le 
Nickel, the principal producer in New Caledonia, in the company's first 
major expansion in many years (Cameron, 1977, p. 121.). A more recent 
example of the importance of government support is provided by the 
rapid rise in aluminum processing capacity in Britain during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, which was stimulated in part by the 40 percent 
plant and machmery and 25 percent buildmg grants the British govern- 
ment made available to new firms in development areas (Warren, 1973, p. 
199). In the zinc industry, Hillrnan (1976) finds so many instances of 
government subsidies and other actions affecting prod.uc tion costs, that 
he concludes public policies have had an overwhelming impact on the 
quantity and location of new investment in this industry. 
In the socialist countries, political considerations have had an even 
greater impact on mine production. The major producer in t h s  group, 
the Soviet Union, has through its development programs tried to minim- 
ize dependence on foreign sources of mineral ores, even though for some 
metals, such as aluminum, this has required the use of low grade, h g h  
cost deposits. T h s  effort to achieve and maintain self-sufficiency is one 
of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union mines more of most metal 
commodities relative to reserves than is typical of major producers 
among the market economy countries. 
Government actions also influence the risk associated with mineral 
ventures. Major mineral projects today require hundreds of millions of 
dollars, and in some cases, billions of dollars. The Caujone mine in Peru, 
whch  produced its first ton of copper ore in 1976, cost over 700 million 
dollars (Mikesell, 1979, p. 128). As a result of inflation, t h s  project would 
now cost well over a billion dollars. Firms must be particularly sensitive 
to the political environment in deciding where to locate such capital 
intensive projects. 
Among the various concerns covered by political risk is the possibil- 
ity that host governments will subsequently raise taxes. As noted earlier, 
Canadian mining firms were caught in the middle of the conflict between 
the federal and provincial governments in the early 1970s. The higher 
taxes that ensued in some cases eliminated all profits. A more common 
story is for a firm to negotiate an agreement with a host government 
prior to developing a new mine and then find that the government 
demands a renegotiation of taxes and other terms after the project is 
successfully on stream (Bergsten et  al. 1978, Chap. 5) .  
Expropriation is another type of political risk. Even when a firm is 
compensated for its invested capital, it loses the return it hoped to real- 
ize on that capital, as well as the managerial and technical talent it 
invested in the project. In 1960, Freeport Minerals lost its ruckel opera- 
tion in Cuba as that country increasingly turned toward socialism. Other 
well known examples include the nationalization of the copper facilities 
owned by Anaconda and Kennecott by Chile in 1971, the iron ore proper- 
ties of U.S. Steel and Bethlehem by Venezuela in 1975, and the bauxite 
facilities of Reynolds by Guyana in 1971. 
Political risk encompasses more than just confiscatory taxation and 
expropriation. Changes in environmental regulations, restrictions on the 
remittance of profits or dividends abroad, requirements to construct 
domestic processing facilities, and other policies affecting the operation 
of mineral ventures can turn a profitable operation into a financial liabil- 
ity. 
Although multinational firms have demonstrated considerable 
ingenuity in devising various means, including project financing and joint 
ventures with host governments. to reduce political risks.lg the latter 
has nevertheless influenced the pattern of new mine investment in many 
metal industries. This is illustrated by recent shifts in copper mining. 
During the 1950s, mine capacity increased rapidly in Peru, Zambia, Zaire, 
and to a lesser extent Chile, as the low grade ore found in most unex- 
ploited deposits in the United States, the world's largest copper pro- 
ducer, discouraged expansion there. During the 1960s, however, political 
risk in these four developing countries increased considerably. In Chle, 
where Anaconda and Kennecott had encountered some problems with the 
government even in the 1950s, hostility toward foreign control of the vital 
mining sector grew more threatening during the 1960s. In the early years 
of that decade, some foreign managers could already see the clouds of 
increasing government intervention and even expropriation gathering on 
the horizon. Similar risks arose in the neighboring state of Peru later in 
the 1960s. 
In Africa, Zaire after winning its independence in 1960 promptly 
became embroiled in a civil war. Then within several years, it national- 
ized its copper industry. Its neighbor, Zambia, became independent from 
Britain in 1964, and shortly thereafter demanded majority control of the 
copper firms operating withn its territories. 
The deteriorating political environment in these countries altered 
the flow of investment funds. Whle large, h g h  grade copper deposits 
remained untouched in Chde, Peru, and other developing countries, the 
multinational mining corporations developed deposits of far lower grade 
and quality in countries considered politically more stable and safe. Ten 
new mines, for example, began operations in western Canada between 
1959 and 1972. The average ore grade was less than 1.0 percent for nine 
of these deposits, and less than 0.6 percent for seven (Galway, 19'75, pp. 
42-43). The developed countries, whose share of world mine production 
dropped from 48 to 41 between 1950 and 1960, not only reversed this 
trend but modestly increased their share of world output during the 
1960s. Among the developing countries the only major producer that 
managed to increase its market share was the Philippines. Nor was t h s  a 
coincidence, as the country was considered relatively stable and secure. 
Governments can influence investment patterns in yet another way, 
through policies that  give firms, usually domestic firms, preferential 
access to  markets. This allows the favored firms to charge higher prices, 
earn greater revenues, and realize larger profits than would otherwise be 
possible. Earlier it was pointed out that the U.S. government stimulated 
the development of the Hanna nickel deposit in Oregon by building a 
smelter and then selling it to the company a t  far below its hstorical cost. 
In addition, the government guaranteed the company a market for its 
nickel a t  a price that covered its smelting costs plus a premium return 
on its ore. Although the Riddle deposit was quite poor compared to 
undeveloped deposits in Canada and elsewhere abroad, the contract with 
the government assured the company a profitable project. In fact, 
Hanna's Nickel Division was very profitable, as net income averaged 39 
percent of total income after taxes over the 1954-1960 period, a rate con- 
siderably above what the company earned on its non-nickel activities 
(Cameron, 1976, pp. 171-174). Nor is the Hanna experience unique. Simi- 
lar U.S. government contracts with Falconbridge allowed that firm to 
expand its nickel mine capacity in Canada. 
Although public policies affecting the cost, risk, and revenues of 
mineral ventures are of greatest importance, other policies also distort 
mineral investment. International Nickel, for example, contemplated 
developing new nickel deposits in New Caledonia in the early 1960s but 
was rebuffed by the French government whch simply refused to approve 
its application. About the same time, the company also considered a new 
mine in Guatemala, but the government there demanded a joint venture 
and the company backed off. For such reasons, International Nickel 
eventually increased its mining capacity in Canada (Cameron, 1976, pp. 
60-64), helping to accentuate the sharp difference in the ratio of nickel 
production to reserves between Canada and New Caledonia found in Fig- 
ure Id. 
Ths study has looked at  comparative advantage in metal mining, and 
found that there is not one but a number of important determinants of 
production. A simple application of the factor endowment theory, which 
maintains that countries are major producers of bauxite, copper, and 
other metal ores simply because they are well endowed with the requisite 
minerals, suffers from several deficiencies. First, it is often not clear 
what is meant by mineral endowment, or how such an endowment should 
be measured. The most appropriate measure appears to be reserves, 
whch considers only those deposits that are both known and profitable to 
exploit. 
Second, mineral deposits and the ores they contain are just one 
input needed for mining. Other factors of production, particularly capital 
and technical and managerial know-how, are also essential. Endowments 
of these resources, like reserves, vary greatly among countries. As they 
are more mobile internationally, however, they have not been a major 
determinant of comparative advantage in mining and the location of mine 
production. 
Third, the factor endowment theory overlooks the attractions of 
established mining districts that tend to reinforce and perpetuate the 
comparative advantage of these areas. In exploration, firms look for new 
deposits where the geological conditions are believed favorable. Ths 
often leads to areas where good deposits have been discovered in the 
past, for at such locations the necessary geological conditions for the 
genesis of ore bodies are known to have existed. Once a mine is 
developed, the capital sunk into the facility inhibits for many years its 
being replaced by a new mine elsewhere simply because production costs 
there become somewhat more favorable. In addition, it is usually cheaper 
to expand existing capacity than to build entirely new mines; and when 
new mines are called for, they are often less expensive to build in esta- 
blished mining regions where the necessary transportation network, 
power facilities, and townsites are already available. 
Fourth, in metal mining, government policies and other political con- 
siderations can greatly affect both expected returns and risks. Indeed, 
many countries well endowed with h g h  quality deposits have not been 
able to attract the necessary capital and expertise to develop their 
mineral wealth either because they have, through high taxes and other 
means, tried to take too large a share of the potential returns, or because 
they have been unable to provide the political stability required by inves- 
tors when committing hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Finally, the factor endowment theory is an incomplete explanation of 
comparative advantage for yet another reason. Since the international 
distribution of mineral endowments, as measured by reserves, evolves 
over time, to the extent that such endowments are an important deter- 
minant of mine production, the theory takes only the first step in explain- 
ing differences in comparative advantage. On the important question of 
why country endowments, and in turn comparative advantage in mining, 
shift over time, it is silent. These shf ts  are caused by the exhaustion of 
operating mines, exploration and the discovery of new deposits, and 
changes in technology, prices, input costs, and the political environment. 
The important factors causing changes in the worldwide distribution of 
reserves must be considered along with the other important deter- 
minants before a full explanation of comparative advantage in mining is 
achieved. 
Footnotes 
l ~ ~ ~ e n d i x  Table l a  shows bauxite production in thousands of tons of 
metal content for the world as a whole, for groups of countries, and for 
the principal producing countries at  ten year intervals over the period 
1950-80. It also indicates the share of world production contributed by 
the major producing countries. Similar information for copper, iron ore, 
nickel, tin, and zinc is found in Appendix Tables l b  - f .  
' ~ u r v e ~ s  of the pure theory of international trade through the early 
1960s are found in Haberler (1961) and Bhagwati (1964). 
3 ~ o r  a review of these theories. see Vernon (1970), particularly the 
chapter by Hufbauer (1970). 
%or more on how mineral endowment might be measured. see 
Brobst (1979), Brooks (1976), McKelvey (1973), Schanz (1975), and Zwar- 
tendyk (1972). 
5 ~ h e s e  estimates, which were made to illustrate the Minerals Availa- 
bility System of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, are based on a number of 
specific assumptions regarding required rate of return, taxes, byproduct 
credits, and other relevant factors (Davidoff, 1980). Why the upper f~gure  
given--70 million tons--is less than the reported U.S. copper reserves (see 
Appendix Table 2b) is not entirely clear, though it appears that 
undeveloped copper properties were not considered in the analysis. In an  
earlier study (Bennett, e t  al., 1973), the U . S .  Bureau of Mines has 
estimated that  a rise in the price of copper from 0.50 to 0.75 to 2.00 dol- 
lars increases U.S. reserves from 75 to 104 to 163 million tons. See also 
Babitzke, et al. (1982). 
%or a survey of geostatistical techniques used for resource evalua- 
tion, see Harris (1975) and Harris and Skinner ( 1982). 
7 ~ o o k  (1980) analyzes the lead-time between the decision to develop 
a mine and its start-up for twelve metal-mine projects. He also provides 
data on the lead-times for 33 copper mines in h s  Table 1, which vary from 
under two years to seven years. These lags exclude the time that  elapses 
between the discovery of a deposit and the decision to develop it ,  and so 
are shorter than those reported by Gries. 
'1, addition, the sources for the reserve data, which are identified in 
Appen&x Tables 2a-f, do not always report information for all countries 
and country groups of interest. This has necessitated that certain figures 
be estimated, as the notes to Appendix Tables 2a-f indicate. 
'~eserve  and production figures are throughout this study measured 
in terms of metal content. 
lowhile conceptually t h s  separation is desirable. in most cases the 
estimated regression line did not change greatly when the major socialist 
countries were included in the analysis. 
''since the coefficient is expected to be positive, a one tailed test is 
used. 
1 2 ~ h e  samples of countries (n) used in estimating the regression 
lines shown in Figures la-f are small, particularly for nickel and zinc. 
This means that one or two countries may greatly affect the results, as is 
shown to be the case for nickel. Whle one might for this reason question 
the usefulness of the regression results, it should be noted that  the sam- 
ples examined are not simply random selections of producing countries. 
With few exceptions, the countries examined together accounted for 75 
percent or more of all production outside the socialist countries. 
1 3 ~ h e  huge decrease in Cuban nickel reserves. as pointed out ear- 
lier, is probably in part due to deficiencies in the data 
'%eta1 prices are average yearly prices from American Metal 
Market, Metal Statistics (annual). 
1 5 ~ o r  more on the changing costs of shipp~ng iron ore. see Manners 
(1971, Chaps. 9-10) and Vogel (1981). 
1 6 ~ h e  boundaries of some ore bodies are not clearly delineated, as 
their ore grade tends to taper off gradually. In such cases, a fall in metal 
prices can make marginal reserves uneconomic to mine, and result in the 
mine closing somewhat sooner than otherwise,. 
''state enterprises have become more important in recent years in 
many metal industries. Government owned mines, for example, now 
account for over 40 percent of the world's copper production outside the 
socialist countries. However, talnng over and running an  operating facil- 
ity is easier than developing an operating mine. As a result, state enter- 
prises account for a smaller share of new mine investment than of world 
mine output. 
ÿÿ or more information on t h s  dispute and its consequences. see 
Gomez (1971). 
l 9 ~ o r  an interesting description of how Kennecott attempted to pro- 
tect  its interests in Chle  through project financing, see Moran (1973). 
For more on the problems posed by political risk and the means firms 
have employed for coping with these problems, see Moran (c .  1980). 
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Notes: 
a ~ a j o r  producing socialist countries are identified in figure 1 by a triangle rather than a dot, 
and were not considered in estimating the relationship between production and reserves. 
The closest year to 1970 for which iron ore reserve data are available is 1967. 
 he closest year to 1970 for which tin reserve data are availa~le is 1968. 
d ~ i n c  reserves for 1970 for all major producing countries other than Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States are estimated based on 1975 reserve figures. 
Sources: Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
Appendix Table l a  
Mine Production of Bauxite by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980' 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
eroup metal total metal total metal total metal total b 
Developed 
Countries 464 28 1127 19 3557 27 7344 37 
Australia 1 0 15 0 1990 15 5979 3 0 
Greece 15 1 177 3 45 8 4 657 3 
U.S. 27 1 16 46 7 8 486 4 359 2 
France 1 45 Q 38 3 7 564 4 341 2 
Other 32 2 8 7 2 58 1 8 0 
Developing 
Countries 947 56 3769 64 7454 58 10376 52 
Guinea 
Jamaica 
Surinam 
Brazil 
Yugoslavia 
Guyana 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Haiti 
Ghana 
Dther 
Socialist 
Countries 267 16 1026 17 1960 15 2350 12 
U.S.S.R. 150 Q 700 12 1300 10 1280 6 
Hungary 116 7 238 4 40 4 3 590 3 
China 0 0 7 0 1 100 1 340 2 
Romania 1 0 18 0 155 1 140 1 
TOTAL 1678 100 5922 100 1297 1 100 20070 100 
Appendix Table la continued 
Notes: 
a~lgures  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  metal content of 1950 bauxite production is estimated for each coun- 
try and country group by multiplying the ratio of the metal content of bauxite 
production in 1955 to the actual weght of that production times 1950 produc- 
tion in actual welght. 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ?'Ae World 
Market for B a d t e :  Characteris t ics  and R e n d s :  S ta t i s t ica l  Annez (1982); and 
Metal S ta t i s t ics  (various years). 
Appendix Table l b  
Mine Production of Copper by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950- 1 9 8 0 ~  
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
eroup metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 1203 48 1729 41 2723 43 2542 33 
U.S. 825 33 980 23 1560 25 1168 15 
Canada 240 10 398 9 6 10 10 708 9 
Australia 15 1 111 3 158 3 232 3 
S. Africa 3 4 1 48 1 149 2 212 3 
Japan 3 9 2 89 2 120 2 53 1 
Other 5 0 2 103 2 126 2 169 2 
Developing 
Countries 
Chile 
Zambia 
Zaire 
Peru 
Philippines 
Mexico 
P N G ~  
Yugoslavia 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 238 9 624 15 1211 19 1812 23 
U.S.S.R. 2 18 9 500 12 925 15 1150 15 
Poland 0 0 11 0 83 1 343 4 
China 5 0 72 2 100 2 165 2 
Bulgaria 0 0 11 0 43 1 62 1 
Other 15 1 30 1 60 1 92 1 
TOTAL 2522 100 4238 100 6379 100 7816 100 
Notes .  
' ~ i ~ u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ a p u a  New Guinea 
S o u r c e :  Metal  S t a t i s t i c s  (various years). 
Appendix Table l c  
Mine Production of Iron by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
1950 1960 
Millions Per- Millions Per- 
of tons of c'ent of tons of cent 
contained of contained of 
metal total metal total 
1970 1980 
Millions Per- Millions Per- 
of tons of cent of tons of cent 
contained of contained of 
metal total metal total 
Country 
and 
country 
group 
Developed 
Countries 
Australia 
U.S. 
Canada 
S. Africa 
Sweden 
France 
U. Kingdom 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Brazil 
India 
Liberia 
Venezuela 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
C hiia 
Other 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table lc continued 
Notes: 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  source for 1950 gives production in actual weight These figures were 
converted to metal content using the ratio for each country and country group 
of the metal content of iron ore production in 1955 to the actual weight of that 
production times 1950 production in actual weight. The data on actual weight 
and metal content for 1955 production are from United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, Statistics o n  Iron Dre (1978). 
' ~ h n e s e  production figures shown for 1950 are for 1952. 
Sources: American Metal Market, Metal Statistics (1952) for 1950 data; 
Wang (1975), p.7, for 1952 data on China; United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, Proposed Establishment o f  an  Annual Statistical Pro- 
gramme Relating t o  Iron Ore: Statistics o n  Iron Ore (1981) for 1960, 1970, and 
1980 data. 
Appendix Table Id  
Mine Production of Nickel by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent 
country contained of 
Group metal total 
Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent 
contained of 
metal total 
Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent 
contained of 
metal total 
Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent 
contained of 
metal total 
Developed 
Countries 114.2 77 
Canada 112.2 76 
Australia 0.0 0 
S. Africa 0.8 0 
Greece 0.0 . 0 
U.S. 0.8 0 
Other 0.4 0 
Developing 
Countries 4.4 3 
New Cal. b 4.3 3 
Indonesia 0.0 0 
Cuba 0.0 0 
Philippines 0.0 0 
~ o m . ~ e ~ . '  0.0 0 
Other 0.1 0 
Socialist 
Countries 29.6 20 
U.S.S.R. 29.0 2 0 
Other 0.6 0 
TOTAL 148.2 100 
Notes: 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to  rounding. 
b ~ e w  Caledonia. 
'~ominican  Republic. 
Source: Metal Statistics (various years), 
Appendix Table l e  
Mine Production of Tin Country by Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1900~ 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of'tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
~ r o u p  metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 3.8 2 5.6 3 13.3 6 17.0 7 
Australia 1.9 1 2.2 1 8.8 4 10.4 4 
U. Kingdom 0.9 1 1.2 1 1.7 1 3.0 1 
S. Africa 0.7 0 1.3 1 2.0 1 2.4 1 
Other 0.3 0 0.9 0 0.8 0 1.2 1 
Developing 
Countries 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Zaire 
Nigeria 
Burma 
otherC 
Socialist 
Countries 12.4 7 51.2 27 33.4 15 35.4 15 
U.S.S.R. 2.0 1 20.0 11 10.0 5 17.0 7 
China 10.1 6 30.0 16 22.0 10 16.0 7 
Other 0.3 0 1.2 1 1.4 1 2.4 1 
TOTAL 176.9 100 189.5 100 217.5 100 234.6 100 
Notes:  
" ~ i ~ u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ a t a  for Brazil for 1950 and 1960 included with other developing coun- 
tries. 
 his category may include a small amount of production from a few 
developed countries. 
Source:  Metal S t a t i s t i c s  (various years) 
Appendix Table If 
Mine Production of Zinc by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years. 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 ~ 0 ~  
Country 
and 
country 
group 
Developed 
Countries 
Canada 
Australia 
U.S. 
Japan 
Irish Rep. 
Spain 
Sweden 
Germany 
Italy 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Peru 
Mexico 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Bolivia 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
China 
N. Korea 
Bulgaria 
Other 
Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
contained of contained of contained of 
metal b total metal total metal total 
1980 
Thousands Per- 
of tons of cent 
contained of 
metal total 
TOTAL 
Appendix Table If continued 
Notes: 
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
bF'roduction for the Irish Republic included with other developed countries 
for 1950 and 1960. 
C~roduc t ion  figures for North Korea are not available for 1950. 
Source :  Metal Statistics (various years). 
Appen&x Table 2a 
Reserves of Bauxite by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years. 1950-1980~ 
1950 1 9 5 8 ~  1970 1980 
Country Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent o'f tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
eroup metalC total metalC total metalC total metalC total 
Developed 
Countries 50 12 173 22 1071 34 1090 23 
Australia 4 1 12 1 16 1016 33 930 20 
Greece 17 4 2 1 3 23 1 140 3 
France 18 4 19 2 2 1 1 10 0 
U.S. 11 3 12 2 11 0 10 0 
Developing 
Countries 285 66 494 64 1864 60 3410 73 
Guinea 2 0 155 20 1097 35 1240 27 
Brazil d d d d 276d gd 510 11 
Jamaica 8 0 19 125 16 203 7 420 9 
Guyana 2 0 5 22 3 24 1 170 4 
Surinam 15 3 53 7 177 6 140 3 
Other 168 39 139 18 87 3 920f 2of 
Socialist 
Countries 97 22 105 14 178 6 150 3 
u.s.s.R.~ 9 2 25 3 76 2 50 1 
Other 8 8 20 80 10 102 3 100 2 
TOTAL 432 100 772 100 3113 100 4660 100 
- 6 9 -  
Appendix Table 2a continued 
Notes :  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  closest year to 1960 for whch bauxite reserves are available is 1958. 
' ~ e t a l  content is estimated for 1950, 1958, and 1970 on the basis of 
alumina grade and the assumption that 50 percent of alumina is aluminum 
metal. Alumina grades for 1958 are estimated on the basis of 1950 and 1970 
grades. The figures for 1980 are estimates of recoverable aluminum, and 
hence not totally comparable to those for earlier years. 
d~razi l ian  reserves for 1950 and 1960 are included with other developing 
countries. The country's 1970 reserves were estimated by averaging its 
reported reserves in 1865 and 1975. 
e ~ . ~ . ~ . ~ .  reserves include low grade ore that would not be counted as 
reserves in most countries. 
f ~ h e  1980 figures for other developing countries include 60 million tons of 
reserves whose country of origin is unspecified. 
S o u r c e s :  Dorr (1975); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mater ia l s  S u r u e y :  BazLzite 
(1953); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral F a c t s  a n d  P r o b l e m s  (various years); U.S. 
Department of the Interior, first Annual  R e p w t  of t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of t h e  In ter ior  
U n d e r  t h e  f ining P o l i c y  Act of 1970 (1972); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral  Com- 
m o d i t y  Summaries (various years); and United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, The World Market for  B a u x i t e :  S t a t i s t i c a l  A n n e z  (1882). 
Appendix Table 2b 
Reserves of Copper by Country and Country Groups, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country 
and 
country 
group 
Developed 
Countries 
U.S. 
Canada 
Australia 
Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Chile 
Zambia 
Peru 
Zaire 
Philippines 
Other 
Socialist 
Countries 
U.S.S.R. 
Poland 
Other 
TOTAL 
1950 1960 1970 1980~ 
Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- 
of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons df cent of tons of cent 
contained of contained of contained of contained of 
metal total metal total metal total metal total 
-71-  
Appendix Table 2b continued 
Notes :  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  source of the 1980 reserve flgures. U.S. Bureau of Mines. Mineral 
C o m m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  (1980), indicates that they are for the reserve base, 
whch it defines as the "in-place part  of the demonstrated (measured plus indi- 
cated) resource from which reserves are estimated. I t  encompasses those 
parts of the resources that are likely to be economically available withn a 
long-term planning frame. The reserve base corresponds closely to  what in 
earlier years the Mineral C o m m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  called reserves. 
'Reserves for 1950 for Poland, other developed countries, other develop- 
ing countries, and other socialist countries were estimated by interpolating 
their 1945 and 1960 reserve figures. 
d ~ e s e r v e s  for 1970 for Australia. the Phlippines. and Poland were 
estimated by interpolating their 1960 and 1980 reserves. 
e ~ o m e  reserves for 1970 and 1980 were classified as belonging to other 
countries without any indication as to whether these were developed or 
developing countries. The division of these reserves between the two country 
groups was made on the basis of the relative mine production of the developed 
and developing countries whose reserves were not separately identified. 
Sources :  U.S. Federal Trade Commisston, Repor t  o n  t h e  Copper  I n d u s t n ~  
(1947); U.S. Bureau of Mines, M a t e r i a l s  S u r v e y :  Copper (1952); A.D. McMahon, 
Copper:  A Mater ia l s  S u r v e y  (1965); U.S. Department of the Interior, Firs t  
Annual  Repor t  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of  t h e  In ter ior  U n d e r  t h e  Mining a n d  Minera ls  
Pol icy  Act of 1970 (1972); Whitney (1976); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral  Com- 
m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  ( 1960). 
Appendix Table 2c 
Reserves of Iron Ore by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Billions Per- Billions Per- Billions Per- Billions Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent' of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
proup metal totalC metal totalC metal totalC metal totalC 
Developed 
Countries 8.9 3 4 12.6 3 1 30.9 32 33.3 35 
Canada .9 3 1.5 4 10.6 11 10.9 12 
Australia .1 0 .3 1 9.2 10 10.7 11 
U.S. 1.7 6 3.0 7 3.3 3 5.3 6 
France 2.5 9 2.1 5 2.4 2 1.6 2 
Sweden 1.4 5 1.4 3 1.8 2 2.0 2 
S. Africa 1.3 5 2.4 6 1.1 1 1.1 1 
Other 1.0 4 1.9 5 2.5 3 1 .7d 2 
Developing 
Countries 14.7 55 23.6 58 24.9 26 29.9 32 
Brazil 4.1 15 7.6 19 14.1 15 16.3 17 
India 5.6 2 1 10.5 25 3.9 4 5.6 6 
Venezuela .2 1 1.3 3 1.2 1 1.3 1 
Liberia 0.0 0 .1 0 .5 1 .6 1 
Other 4.8 18 4.1 10 5.2 5 6.1d 6 
Socialist 
Countries 2.9 11 4.4 11 40.8 42 3 1.5 33 
U.S.S.R. 2.0 8 3.1 8 38.5 40 28.1 30 
China .8 3 1.1 3 2.1 2 2.7 3 
Other .1 0 .2 0 .2 0 .7 1 
TOTAL 26.5 100 40.6 100 96.6 100 94.7 100 
-73-  
Appendix Table 2c continued 
Notes :  
a~ese r v e s  for 1960 and 1970 are not available. The closest available years 
are 1954 and 1967. 
b ~ h e  source of the 1980 reserve figures. U.S. Bureau of Mines. Mineral 
C o m m o d i t y  Summaries (198O), indicates that they are for the reserve base, 
wbch  it defines as the "in-place part of the demonstrated (measure plus indi- 
cated) resource from which reserves are estimated. It encompasses those 
parts of the resources that are likely to be economically available withn a 
long-term planning frame." The reserve base corresponds closely to what in 
earlier years the Mineral C o m m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  called reserves. 
' ~ i ~ u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
d ~ e s e r v e s  for 1980 were not separately identified for South Africa, other 
developed countries, and other developing countries. The division of reserves 
between the other developed and other developing countries was made on the 
basis of their relative production of iron ore. The reserves of South Africa were 
assumed to be the same in 1980 as in 1967. These reserves--1.1 bilhon tons- 
were then taken from the estimated reserves for other developed countries. 
Scrurces: U.N. ,  World I r o n  Ore R e s w c e s  a n d  Their  U t i l i z a t i o n  (1950); U.N., 
S u r v e y  of World I r o n  Ore Resources  (1955); U.N. ,  S u r u e y  of World I r o n  Ore 
Resources  ( 1970) ; U .S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral C o m m o d i t y  Summaries ( 1980). 
Appendix Table 2d 
Reserves of Nlckel by Country and Co ,yt ry  Group. 
Selected Years. 1950-1980 
Country Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of 
proup metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 
Canada 4.1 12 9.1 14 7.9 15 
Australia .O 0 .9 1 5.1 9 
U.S. .5 2 .2 0 .3 1 
Other -0 0 1.5 2 1.oC 2 
Developing 
Countries 28.5 86 45.2 68 32.6 60 
New Caledonia 1.0 3 15.0 23 13.6 25 
Indonesia .5 2 7.3 11 7.1 13 
Philippines 4.0 12 4.1 6 5.2 10 
Cuba 22.1 67 16.3 25 3.1 6 
Dominican Rep. .O 0 0.7 1 1 .O 2 
Other .9 3 1.8 3 2.6' 5 
Socialist 
Countries 
U,S-S.R- .1 0 9.1 14 7.3 13 
Other .O 0 .I 0 .O 0 
TOTAL 33.2 100 66.1 100 54.1 100 
Notes:  
a ~ a t a  on nickel reserves around 1960 not available. 
b ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
'~eserves  for Africa, whch were not broken down by country, were divided 
between developed countries (South Africa) and developing countries on the 
basis of their relative 1980 mine production of nickel. 
Sources:  Hubbard (1975); U.S. Bureau of Mines, 1950 Materials  Survey: 
Nickel (1952); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Fac t s  a n d  Prob lems  (various edi- 
tions). 
Appendix Table 2e 
Reserves of Tin by Country and Country Group, 
Seleted Years, 1950-1980~ 
Country Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- Thousands Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
group metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 141 2 140 3 1 46 3 640 7 
Australia 35 1 43 1 82 2 33 0 3 
U.Kingdom 40 1 43 1 38 1 260 3 
Other 66e 1 54e 1 26e 1 5oe 1 
Developing 
Countries 4934 73 3964 7 5 3534 80 6560 68 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Bolivia 
Burma 
Brazil 
Nigeria 
Zaire 
Other 
Sacialis t 
Countries 1650 25 1186 2 2 72 1 16 2500 25 
China 1500 22 1004 19 508 1 1  1500 15 
U.S.S.R. 150f 2 182 3 2 13 5 1000 10 
TOTAL 6725 100 5290 100 440 1 100 9700 100 
-76-  
Appendix Table 2e continued 
Notes:  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  source for 1950 was at  times unclear whether reserve figures were in 
metric or long tons. In such cases, metric tons were assumed. 
C The closest year to 1970 for whch reserves are available is 1968. 
d ~ h e  source of the 1980 reserve figures. U.S Bureau of Mines. Mineral 
Commodi t y  S u m m a r i e s  (1980), indicates that they are for the reserve base, 
whch it defines as the "in-place part of the demonstrated (measured plus indi- 
cated) resource from which reserves are estimated. It encompasses those 
parts of the resources that are likely to be economically available withn a 
long-term planning frame." The reserve base corresponds closely to what in 
earlier years the Mineral Commodi t y  S u m m a r i e s  called reserves. 
e ~ e s e r v e s  for other developed and other developing countries were not 
separately identified. The division of reserves between these two groups was 
made on the basis of their relative mine production of tin. 
f ~ h e s e  figures were estimated by tahng a multiple of production, by inter- 
polation, or by other means. 
g'I'he reserve figure for Bolivia shown for 1960 is actually for 1961. 
Source:  President's Materials Policy Commission, Resources fo r  F r e e d o m  
(1952); Robertson (1965); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mine-ral Facts  a n d  Prob lems  
( 1970); and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodi t y  S u m m a r i e s  ( 1980). 
Appendix Table 2f 
Reserves of Zinc by Country and Country Group, 
Selected Years, 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 ~ 0 ~  
Country hlillions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- Millions Per- 
and of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent of tons of cent 
country contained of contained of contained of contained of 
group metal total metal total metal total metal total 
Developed 
Countries 35.9 56 49.9 65 78.6 67 171.0 7 1 
Canada 4.5 7 15.1 20 3O.e 26 62.0 26 d 
U.S. 7.7 12 12.2 16 27.2 23 48.0 20 
Australia 12.7 20 1C.C 13 9.1 8 24.0 10 
Other 1 l.of'g 17 12.6~'g 16 1 1 . 5 ~  10 37 .oh 15 
Developing 
Countries 18.2 28 15.3 20 20.2 17 45.0 19 
Peru e e e e e e 7.0 3 
Mexico 3.5d 5 6.0 8 3.6 3 3.0 1 
Other 14.7f~g 23 ~ . 3 ~ * g  12 1 6 . 6 ~  14 35 .Oh 15 
Socialist 
Countries 1 0 . 2 ~  16 11.2~ 15 18.1 15 24.0 10 
TOTAL 64.3 100 76.4 100 116.9 100 240.0 100 
-78-  
Appendix Table 2f continued 
Notes :  
a ~ i g u r e s  may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
b ~ h e  closest year to 1960 for wbch  reserves are available is 1957. 
C The source of the 1980 reserve figure, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Com- 
m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  (1980), indicates that they are for the reserve base, wbch 
it defines as the "in-place part of the demonstrated (measure plus indicated) 
resource from from which reserves are estimated. It encompasses those parts 
of the resources that are likely to be economically available wlthin a long-term 
plann~ng frame." The reserve base corresponds closely to what in earlier years 
the Mineral C o m m o d i t y  S u m m a r i e s  called reserves. 
d ~ e s e r v e s  for Canada and Mexico for 1950 are estimates based on their 
combined reserves. 
e Reserves for Peru for 1950, 1960, and 1970 are included with other 
developing countries. 
'Reserves for Yugoslavia for 1950 and 1957 are included with other 
developed countries, rather than other developing countries. 
g~ese r v e s  for Asia were not broken down by country in 1950 and 1957. In 
calculating the reserves held by other developed countries, other developing 
countries, and the socialist countries, 90 percent of the 1950 reserves for Asia 
were assumed to be in Japan, 5 percent in China, and 5 percent in developing 
countries. For 1957, 65 percent of Asian reserves were assumed to be in Japan, 
30 percent in Chma, and 5 percent in developing countries. 
h~e se r v e s  for other developed and other developing countries were not 
separately identified in 1970 and 1980. The division of reserves between these 
two groups was made on the basis of their relative mine production of zinc. 
Sources:  U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mater ia l s  S u r v e y :  Zinc (1950); U . S .  Bureau 
of Mines, Mineral Fac t s  a n d  P r ob l ems  (1960); U.S. Department of the Interior, 
F'imt Annual  Repor t  of the  S e c r e t a r y  of the  In ter ior  Under  the  Mining Minera ls  
Policy Act of 1970 (1972); U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodi t ies  S u m -  
maries (1980). 
